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Abstract 
In recent decades, a Kurdish diaspora has begun to appear and its emergence 
has influenced the nature of the Kurdish question which has until then been a 
conflict mainly involving the Kurds and the states of the Middle East. 
Subsequently Kurdish communities have become  very active in the diaspora, 
imposing themselves on the political agendas of most European countries. 
This change was most dramatic  when the Kurds in Iraq began to develop 
self-government in 1991 which was recognized constitutionally after the fall 
of Saddam Hussein regime. The Iraqi Kurdistan turned out to be a centre of 
attraction for the Kurds who were living in diaspora including Turkey, Iran 
and Syria. 
The relationship between the diaspora and the homeland is addressed in this 
paper in the context of such changes. The aim is to  at study how the on-
going nation-building process in Iraqi Kurdistan affects the Kurdish diaspora. 
It explores how the long enduring Kurdish struggle for nationhood and the 
relatively new transnational space of the Kurdish diaspora can interact and 
changes take place in both spaces. It is argued that the Kurdish diaspora has 
responded to the developments in homeland through different forms of 
diaspora circulation, rather than returning to homeland which was supposed 
in the previous studies.  
This paper is based on the results of  qualitative research which was 
conducted among the ‘elites’ of the Kurdish diaspora in Sweden, the UK, the 
Netherlands and Belgium in 2008. 
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1.  Introduction 
‘Kurdistanê Azad Çebû’ (‘A free Kurdistan is born’) 
The Kurds, who live in different countries of the Middle East and in 
the diaspora, have used this popular motto to express the developments in the 
Kurdish region of Iraq since the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime. 
What it implies is the realization of a historical dream of the Kurds which can 
be summarized as the quest for their own state. This article aims to explore 
Kurdish Diaspora 
______________________________________________________________ 
2 
the impact of these developments that took place in Iraqi Kurdistan on the 
Kurdish diaspora.  
In general, the nation-building process of the Kurds  is related to the 
nation-building processes in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria, the countries 
governing the Kurds in the Middle East, which have given rise to different 
forms of exclusion of Kurds within them.
1
 One of the most important results 
of this exclusion has been the migration movements of the Kurds which 
formed a Kurdish diaspora. Therefore, the formation of a Kurdish diaspora 
has from its beginning been intertwined with the nationhood process of Kurds 
and the nation-building in their so-called ‘host’ states.  
In this sense the relationship between diaspora and homeland is a 
very common focal point for studies on the Kurdish diasporas, although this 
is  studied from different perspectives.
2
 In such studies, two arguments 
concerning the relationship between diaspora and homeland have come to the 
forefront: ‘Almost all Kurdish refugees wish to return to Kurdistan when 
conditions are appropriate’3 and ‘the concept of homeland for the members 
of diaspora is  vague and ambivalent, since Kurdistan does not exist as a 
juridical- political reality.’ 4 
This article aims to advance on these two arguments, assuming the 
conditions are now appropriate given the concept of the homeland has 
become concrete through the self-governing experience in the Kurdish region 
of Iraq which has turned into a de facto Kurdish state. What effects did the 
emergence of the de facto Kurdish state in Iraq have on the Kurdish diaspora? 
Is there a return of Kurdish diaspora? And did they formulate a more 
inclusive and cohesive discourse of the diasporic identity instead of the 
‘home-oriented’ nationalist discourse based on victimhood? 
These questions are discussed from the perspectives of the people 
who are involved in the diaspora. Qualitative research through semi-
structured in-depth interviews was conducted with those people who are 
actively involved in the Kurdish diaspora.
5
 The present analysis draws on 17 
life stories through which interviewees referred to the themes of a returning 
diaspora and the formation of a diaspora identity. 
 
2.  The Formation of Kurdish Diaspora 
The migration movements of Kurds and the formation of a Kurdish 
diaspora should be discussed in conjunction with the social and historical 
development of Iraqi Kurdistan. Since the 1970s, we can talk about four great 
migration movements of Iraqi Kurds. The first three of them occurred as a 
result of the on-going struggle against the Iraqi state and they had a mainly 
regional and temporal character. Hundreds of thousands of Kurds had crossed 
into Iran and Turkey in order to protect themselves against attack by the Iraqi 
army. Relatively small numbers of peoples have been able to migrate to 
Europe. However the main Kurdish exodus to Europe from Iraqi Kurdistan 
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took place in the 1990s which can be considered as the fourth wave. This 
started mainly after 1993 due to the economic embargo imposed upon Iraqi 
Kurdistan and has accelerated during the internal fighting among the Kurdish 
groups between 1994 and 1998.  
The migration movements of the Kurds from Turkey, Iran and Syria 
have followed their own way, however, it can be generalized that the 
population movement had a ‘transnational’ character after the 1960s when 
the wave of mainly Turkish workers towards West European countries 
started. Among them the Kurds  were a significant number,  although in the 
beginning their Kurdishness was not explicitly stated. Transnational 
migration has continued in 1970s and 80s in the form of refugee movements, 
because of the oppressive policies of Turkish, Iraqi and Iranian states against 
the Kurds. In the same period of time, a very wide economic migration has 
also taken place. 
As a result of these different waves of migration, a Kurdish 
diaspora, composing of different Kurdish communities living in different 
Western countries has emerged.  Although no precise and reliable census of 
the Kurdish diaspora in Europe has been carried out, the most widely 
accepted estimates set their number at about 1.4 million in Western Europe 
and North America, nearly 85% of them from Turkey.
6
 The number of Kurds 
from Iraq increased in the 1990s and now they form the largest part of the 
Kurdish communities in Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden and the 
United States.
7
 
This diaspora was mainly based on the ‘home-oriented’ nationalist 
discourse which depicted itself as a victim diaspora.
8
 The Kurdish popular 
narrative of exile considers the Kurds’ tragic and traumatic past a major 
driving force for them entering the diaspora and their practice of ‘long-
distance nationalism’ , which they maintain vis-à-vis their ‘land of origin’. In 
this sense, arguments such as ‘we are all Kurds’ and ‘we do not belong here 
because here is not our country’ have been very common among the Kurds in 
the diaspora, independently of their social or political affiliations.
 9
 However 
the emergence of the de facto Kurdish state in northern Iraq has led to the 
important changes, including the change in the depiction of the Kurdish 
diaspora as a victim diaspora and the reconstruction of a new diasporic 
identity.  
 
3. The Victim Diaspora and the Myth of Return  
Most of the interviewees narrated their personal migration history 
and their position in a kind of ‘victim diaspora’, and their status as ‘guest:  
 
When we first got here, everybody was thinking ‘we will 
stay for a limited period of time here’. Many people 
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thought of themselves as guests and many still think of 
themselves as guest. 
 
Generally the interviewees were using the term ‘diaspora’ to define 
themselves. Through this  usage, they were mostly focusing on dispersion 
from their homeland of origin and the preservation of a distinctive identity 
vis-a–vis the host society. However there were also some hesitations in using 
this term, which may have be due to the fact that they were still considering 
themselves guests. In this sense, it can be argued that the conception of the 
diaspora is developing, but not established yet, as one interviewee noted; 
‘The Kurds are becoming gradually a diaspora. Maybe in the next 20-30 
years, Kurds will have genuinely something called Diaspora.’  
In terms of the formation process of the Kurdish diaspora, all 
interviewees narrated their personal experiences as refugees on the basis of 
the critical events of the nation-building process in Iraqi Kurdistan. They had 
mainly migrated in the refugee waves of the late 1970’s and 1980’s and had 
been politically very active. Therefore they had been very sensitive to the 
political developments in the homeland which led to the assumption of a 
returning diaspora, as noted by Safran, ‘when the conditions are appropriate, 
they or their descendants would (or should) eventually return to their 
ancestral homeland.’10  
I assumed that the latest developments in Iraqi Kurdistan could 
bring about such a return to the homeland for the Iraqi Kurds. However the 
figures did not bear witness to this. According to the figures provided by of 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), even though there is a slight 
increase in the number of people returning to Iraq since 2003, the total 
number of returnees between 2003 and 2007 did not exceed 11.000.
11
 And 
not all of them were Kurds. Briefly we cannot assume a ‘return movement’ 
among the Iraqi Kurds, although they consider the developments in Iraqi 
Kurdistan successful. In this sense a returning diaspora is a kind of myth 
which was explicitly described as such by the interviewees: 
 
It would be individual cases. As group I do not expect them 
to go back. For a simple reason: their living conditions here 
are much better. The most expectedly what will happen is 
that they will have a residency here and another there.  
 
However a very limited number of the refuges, mostly from the 
political and cultural elite of the Kurdish diaspora, have returned to assume 
posts in the universities and the governmental offices. Some of the 
interviewees had gone to Iraqi Kurdistan in order to participate into some on-
going projects. Although they had the intention of staying there, they could 
not. It can be claimed that maybe the developments in Iraqi Kurdistan had not 
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reached the level of ‘appropriate’, which was put forward as a condition for a 
return in previous studies. The interviewees pointed out many shortcomings, 
problems and offered critiques related to the current situation in northern 
Iraq.  
Instead of a returning diaspora, alternative forms of diasporic 
circulation among the members of the Kurdish Diaspora have developed. The 
development of the self-governing experience in Iraqi Kurdistan since 1991 
has opened doors for more contact with the homeland. This process has 
developed significantly  after 2003; for example, the opportunity of direct 
flight between the diaspora and the homeland has accelerated transnational 
connections. As one interviewee noted; ‘Visiting Kurdistan has become a part 
of our everyday. There are many families, who stay there for 6 months and 
here for 6 months.’ 
 Mobility between the diaspora and the homeland took other forms 
also including the movement of people knowledge and capital. The 
interviewees seem to be very confident about their roles as actors in this 
process. They mainly considered the diaspora as involving human capital and 
the homeland physical capital, especially the economic capital. This became 
very obvious when they talked enthusiastically about the various projects 
which they had developed. They saw this period as a construction process 
and the ‘making of the project’ as the most popular way of communicating 
with the homeland.  
Another interesting finding about the relationship between the 
diaspora and the homeland is the changing mentality of the political forces in 
Iraqi Kurdistan towards diasporic Kurds. As one interviewee stated; 
 
Until the 90’s, the political forces in Iraqi Kurdistan were 
seeing diaspora Kurds as lost. During the 90’s, there has 
been a significant change in their attitude. They came to 
look at diaspora Kurds as a national resource to be used and 
to be accounted for.  
 
However this increasing contact between the diaspora and the 
homeland can also create tension due to changing expectations. In general, 
the leadership in Iraqi Kurdistan expects the Kurds in the diaspora just to help 
with the building of the country and lobby for it. On the contrary members of 
the Kurdish diaspora criticise the Kurdish authorities for having clear 
expectation but no clear policy towards the diaspora. The members of the 
diaspora also consider themselves as being more ‘modern’ and ‘developed’ 
than those Kurds  with political power. Some respondents, for example,  
talked about how the discourse of democracy is stronger in the diaspora than 
in Iraqi Kurdistan. This has the possibility of creating a cleavage in the 
relationship between the diaspora and the homeland. As noted by one 
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interviewee; ‘In the past the Turkish, Syrian, Iranian or Iraqi elites were 
oppressing us. If the Kurdish elites were as bad as them, what difference does 
it make for me?’ 
Consequently it might be premature to assess increasing movement  
between the diaspora and the homeland and other forms of diaspora 
circulation have changed the main pattern of the relationship between the 
diaspora and the homeland. 
 
4. The Diaspora and Identity 
Modern Kurdish identity which has largely developed as a reaction 
to cultural and political domination by the Turks, Persians and Arabs, has a 
very fragmented structure based on its internal as well as transnational 
character. 
12
 The emergence of the diaspora had an explicit impact on the 
ethno-national identity of the Kurdish immigrants in the sense that they 
discovered their Kurdishness in the diaspora. Asnoted by one interviewee: 
 
When I came to Sweden, I just realized that I have no need 
to be Iraqi since I was no longer under the oppression of the 
Iraqi regime. I discovered my Kurdishness here. 
 
Another important impact of the diaspora on identity is related to its 
unifying capability towards the formation of a general Kurdish identity. So 
the creation of a diasporic identity can make it possible to transcend the 
fragmented structure of the Kurdish identity. As one interviewee noted: 
 
The Kurds in the diaspora have more in common together 
than Kurds in Kurdistan. A Kurd in Sulaimaniyah would 
have very little in common with a Kurd in Diyarbakir in 
terms of dialect, culture, sense of humour and daily life. 
But a Kurd from Britain, a British Kurd whose parents are 
from Diyarbakir and a British Kurd whose parents are from 
Sulaimaniyah have more in common. They understand each 
other more and they have values that can actually be 
matched.  
 
Although diasporic experience has allowed the Kurds in the diaspora 
to have multiple identities rather than one based on a very strong reference to 
‘the homeland’, most of the interviewees combined this with their newly 
acquired diasporic identity as such, ‘I am Kurdish. I sometimes say British 
Kurd. But the first thing when someone asks me who are you, with great 
pride, I say, I am Kurdish.’ 
In this sense, the homeland has still much importance in defining 
members of the Kurdish diaspora. Moreover the development of Iraqi 
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Kurdistan as a locus for Kurdish national identity has exerted a very positive 
influence over the members of the diaspora personally, as one interviewee 
noted:  
 
Even up to 2003, the mental and sentimental power that I 
had was lesser. After that, when the Kurds became 
stronger, I felt myself strong as well here. Now the people 
regard me as somebody valuable, as somebody having a 
valuable identity. 
 
How they are perceived in Iraqi Kurdistan is much more complex, 
and sometimes it can even be considered as ‘traumatic’. One of the 
respondents explained this as ‘being a guest in both places’: 
 
Here, you always have in your mind Kurdistan as 
homeland, home. When you go home and people think that 
you do not belong to there, you are a guest and ask ‘where 
are you from?’ It creates a feeling that you have lost both, 
instead of gaining both. Being a guest in both places gives 
you a strange feeling. That is not comfortable. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this article, I have investigated how the Kurdish diaspora has 
been influenced by the developments in Iraqi Kurdistan. And as a general 
conclusion, it can be said that the relationship between the homeland and the 
diaspora has gained a new form rather than a returning diaspora, as it was 
assumed by the previous studies on the Kurdish Diaspora. The Iraqi Kurds 
have experienced different forms of diaspora circulation, which involve 
integration in the host societies as well as keeping the relations to the 
homeland alive. These new forms of circulation include homeland visits, 
return-visits, transferring knowledge capital and investment, acting as human 
capital in developing various projects and lobbying for the homeland. The 
establishment of the de facto Kurdish state in Iraq has qualitatively affected 
this process in the sense that it has created a more stable atmosphere and 
provided more resources to advance it. 
More importantly, it appears that people in the diaspora develop a 
distinct identity in a very general sense, and the assumed identification of the 
diaspora members themselves with the homeland can take other forms in the 
course of time.  
Last but not the least; we can also talk about a change in the 
depiction of the Kurdish diaspora. What takes place is a shift from being a 
victimized, ethno-national, homeland-oriented diaspora to one that is 
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orientated towards being a transnational-diasporia. One of the recent studies 
calls this ‘from a victim diaspora to transborder citizenship’.13 This shift also 
implies the change in the conception of homeland and the nationhood or 
nation-building process. In Khayeti’s words, ‘the practice of transborder 
citizenship creates a new notion of home, which can be imagined beyond any 
assimilationist form of state belongingness as it is lived both here and 
there.’14 In this sense, the Kurdish diaspora now has much more capability 
and opportunity to be an influential actor for the general process of Kurdish 
nationhood.  
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